HENRIK HORN

Professor of International Economics  

 

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CURRENT AFFILIATIONS

-         Senior Research Fellow, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm

-         Non-resident Senior Fellow, Bruegel, Brussels

-         Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London

-         Senior Programme Associate, Global Economics Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence

-         Associate Editor of Journal of World Trade 

 

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PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS

-        The Law and Economics of Trade Agreements

-    The Law and Economics of International Investment Agreements

-         Industrial Organization and Antitrust

-         Regulation

 

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PREVIOUS POSITIONS

-         Chief Reporter of the American Law Institute project Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law

2002-2012 (jointly with Petros C. Mavroidis)

-         Professor of International Economics, 1994-2007, and Deputy Director, 2000-2004, Institute for International

Economic Studies, Stockholm University 

-         Counsellor, Economics Research and Analysis Division, World Trade Organization, 1996-2000

-         Marknadsdomstolen Justice (the Swedish supreme court for antitrust cases)

 

Professional biography

 

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RECENT WRITINGS

          

  “Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements”, IFN Working Paper No. 1140, and CEPR Discussion Paper No. 11879, 2017 (with Thomas Tangerås)

  Innebär TTIP och TPP att WTO är passé?”, 2015 (reviderad version publicerad i Ekonomisk Debatt)

“Investment Protection in Regional Trade Agreements”, 2015 (with Chad P. Bown)

“Introduction: Wilfred J. Ethier on Trade and Trade Policy”, International Journal of Economic Theory 10, 2014, pp. 1-7 (with Kazuo Nishimura and Makoto Yano) 

“Can Border Carbon Adjustments Fit Into the Trade Regime?”, Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/06 (with André Sapir)

“The ECJ Judgment on the Extensions of the ETS to Aviation: An Economist’s Discontent”, IFN Working Paper No. 980, 2013

“The Time WTO Panels Require to Issue Reports”, IFN Working Paper No. 979, 2013

“Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO: Silence Speaks Volumes”, International Journal of Economic Theory, 2014. IFN Working Paper No. 983, 2013 (with Petros C. Mavroidis)

“Why the WTO? An Introduction to the Economics of Trade Agreements”, in Horn, H and P.C: Mavroidis (eds), Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2013. IFN Working Paper No. 916, 2012 (with Gene M. Grossman) 

“Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law: National Treatment”, in Horn, H and P.C: Mavroidis (eds), Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2013. IFN Working Paper No. 917 (with Gene M. Grossman and Petros C. Mavroidis)

“In the Shadow of the DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees”, Journal of World Trade 47(4), 729–759, 2013. IFN Working Paper No. 960 (with Petros C. Mavroidis and Erik N. Wijkström)

 

More writings

 

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ONGOING PROJECTS

The Law and Economics of International Investment Agreements

International investment agreements (IIAs) are state-to-state treaties that aim to promote foreign investment by protecting foreign investors against host country policy measures. IIAs typically require host countries to compensate investors in case of expropriation or measures with similar effects, and they contain a range of other provisions, including non-discrimination of foreign investment. The agreements normally include investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms that enable foreign investors to litigate against host countries outside their domestic legal systems. IIAs have become highly controversial, being a main target for the critique against the main  proposed or existing regional trade agreements, such as the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The importance of IIAs in the policy debate notwithstanding, there hardly exist any economic analysis of the desirable design of IIAs, and their effects. The purpose of this project is to contribute the creation of such a field.


Standard-Essential Patents and the International Jurisdiction of National Antitrust 

Technical standards, such as e.g. the 4G standard for mobile communication, often build on patented technologies. The underlying patents are then said to be “essential”. The standards are developed in a large number of standard-setting organizations (SSOs), in which firms and other interested parties participate. Since holders of essential patents could potentially exploit very significant market power, SSOs normally request its members to sell licenses for their essential patents on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms. The FRAND notion is obviously very vague, and there are often conflicts between patent holders and prospective licensees regarding how to interpret the concept in practice. The main regulatory instrument to prevent holders of essential patents to charge excessive fees is antitrust, and in particular rules concerning “abuse of dominance”, or similar legislation. 


A complicating factor for the antitrust enforcement of FRAND commitments is the fact that standards often have international implications. For instance, the 4G standard is used by firms and consumers across the world. At the same time, antitrust is conducted by national authorities. These authorities can be expected to be sensitive to national interests in various ways. This raises the question of how to allocate jurisdiction across these national authorities. The purpose of this project is to evaluate the economic desirability of the allocation that would follow from the  “default rules” in Customary International Law, which is the main legal norm for the international allocation of jurisdiction.  


WTO Dispute Settlement Data Set

Petros C. Mavroidis and I have compiled an extensive data set on the Dispute Settlement system of the WTO. The data set comprises almost 50 000 observations on legal and administrative aspects of all 507 WTO disputes initiated since the inception of the WTO 1 January 1995 to May 2016. The data set tracks each dispute from the initial Request for Consultations, through adjudication, and implementation. The data set, and the document “User’s Guide” describing the structure of the data, can be found at the Global Governance Program website. 


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PREVIOUS PROJECTS

Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law

Petros C. Mavroidis and I have been Co-Chief Reporters for the American Law Institute project Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law. In this long-run project, economists and lawyers jointly analyze the WTO Agreement and the case law from its Dispute Settlement system. To date, over 100 WTO disputes have been analyzed by dyads of economists and lawyers. The project is now run under the auspices of the Global Governance Program, European University Institute, Florence, with Chad Bown and Petros C. Mavroidis as project leaders.

Description of the project

Reports in the Case Law project

 

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CONTACT

Email: A@B where A is henrik.horn and B is econ-law.se

Phone: +46 8 665 45 40

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Updated: November 2017